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Abstract. A review of the state-of-the-art in direct and indirect at-
tacks to fingerprint and iris automatic recognition security systems is
presented. A summary of the novel liveness detection methods, which
take advantage of different physiological properties to distinguish be-
tween real and fake biometric traits, is also reported.
1 Introduction
Biometric systems can offer several advantages over classical security methods
based on something you know (PIN, Password, etc.) or something you have
(key, card, ID, etc.) [1, 2]. Traditional authentication systems are not prepared
to discriminate between impostors who have illegally acquired the privileges to
access a system and the genuine user. Furthermore, in biometric systems there
is no need for the user to remember difficult PIN codes that could be easily
forgotten or to carry a key that could be lost or stolen.
However, in spite of these advantages, biometric systems have some draw-
backs [3], including: i) the lack of secrecy (e.g. everybody knows our face or could
get our fingerprints), and ii) the fact that a biometric trait cannot be replaced
(if we forget a password we can easily generate a new one, but no new fingerprint
can be generated if an impostor “steals” it). Furthermore, biometric systems are
vulnerable to external attacks which could decrease their level of security.
In [4] Ratha identified and classified eight different points of attack on bio-
metric recognition systems, which are depicted in Fig. 1. These vulnerability
points can broadly be divided into two main groups:
Direct attacks. In [4] the possibility to generate synthetic biometric samples (for
instance, speech, fingerprints or face images) in order to fraudulently access a
system was discussed and defined as the first vulnerability point in a biometric
security system. These attacks at the sensor level are referred to as direct attacks.
It is worth noting that in this type of attacks no specific knowledge about the
system operation is needed (matching algorithm used, feature extraction, feature
vector format, etc). Furthermore, the attack is carried out in the analog domain,
outside the digital limits of the system, so the digital protection mechanisms
(digital signature, watermarking...) can not be used.
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Fig. 1. Architecture of an automated biometric verification system. Possible attack
points are numbered from 1 to 8.
Indirect attacks. This group includes all the remaining seven points of attack
identified in [4]. Attacks 3 and 5 might be carried out using a Trojan Horse
that bypasses the feature extractor, and the matcher respectively. In attack 6
the system database is manipulated (a template is changed, added or deleted)
in order to gain access to the application. The remaining points of attack (2,
4, 7 and 8) are thought to exploit possible weak points in the communication
channels of the system, extracting, adding or changing information from them.
In opposition to direct attacks, in this case the intruder needs to have some
information about the inner working of the recognition system and, in most
cases, physical access to some of the application components (feature extractor,
matcher, database...) is required.
In the present paper we summarize the most relevant attacks carried out
on biometric recognition systems based on fingerprints and iris, with special
emphasis on the fingerprint trait, where big research efforts on its vulnerability
have been made. Some of the recently developed liveness detection techniques,
which act as countermeasures against direct attacks, are also introduced.
This paper is structured as follows. Attacks on fingerprint and iris verification
systems are reported in Sect. 2. A summary of direct attacks in the fingerprint
trait can be found in Sect. 2.1, while indirect attacks to fingerprint recognition
systems and direct attacks to iris-based security systems are detailed in Sect. 2.2
and Sect. 2.3 respectively. In Sect. 3.1 and Sect. 3.2 the liveness detection meth-
ods used in fingerprint- and iris-based applications are presented. Finally some
general conclusions are drawn in Sect. 4.
2 Attacks on Fingerprint and Iris Verification Systems
2.1 Direct attacks on fingerprint-based recognition systems
Fingerprint verification systems are currently the most widely spread in the
biometric market commanding more than half of the industry [5], thanks to
their high acceptability among users, their use in the forensic environment, and
the fact that they can be easily embedded in many electronic devices such as
PDA’s, mobile phones, keyboards, etc. This has given rise to a big interest in
Vulnerabilities in Biometric Systems 3
the scientific community to study the robustness of this type of systems to direct
attacks.
There have been different studies reported in literature regarding the analysis
of vulnerabilities of fingerprint-based biometric systems to direct attacks. In [6]
the authors classify the different methods to create gummy fingers in two main
categories: with and without the cooperation of the legitimate user. In [6] two
methods are described (one of each class) and results on six commercial sensors
(optical and solid state) are reported. Out of the six sensors tested five of them
accepted the imitation as real on the first attempt while the remaining sensor
permitted the access to the system on the second attempt.
Matsumoto et al. [7] carried out similar experiments to those reported in
[6] this time with fake fingerprints made of gelatin. Again they distinguished
between the case in which they had the cooperation of the fingerprint owner
and the situation in which the latent fingerprint had to be lifted from a surface.
In the case in which the genuine user cooperated to make the gummy fingers,
recognition rates between 68 and a 100% were reported for the fake fingerprints
in all the 11 systems tested. For the imitations generated without the cooperation
of the user the acceptance rate was always above 60%.
More recently, in [8] the authors tested two fingerprint verification systems,
one minutiae based and the other one based on the ridge pattern, over a data-
base of over 500 real samples and as many fake images captured with two dif-
ferent sensors (optical and thermal sweeping). The gummy fingers were made
out of modeling silicone and three scenarios were considered in the experiments,
namely: i) enrolment and test with real fingerprints, ii) enrolment and test with
fake fingerprints, and iii) enrolment with real fingerprints and test with the re-
spective imitations. Both systems showed a considerable decrease in their level
of performance when being attacked (third scenario considered).
Some other interesting experiments concerning direct attacks on fingerprint-
based verification systems can be found in [9] and [10].
2.2 Indirect Attacks on fingerprint-based recognition systems
Although Hill in [11] reported an attack to a biometric system database (vulner-
ability point 6 in Fig. 1), most of the works regarding indirect attacks use some
type of variant of the hill climbing technique [12]. In this preliminar work a ba-
sic hill climbing attack is introduced and tested over a simple image recognition
system based on filter-based correlation. This attack uses the score given by the
matcher to iteratively change a synthetically created template until the score
exceeds a fixed decision threshold and the access to the system is granted. Thus,
depending on whether we create a synthetic image file or we directly generate
the synthetic feature vector, these attacks can belong to type 2 or 4, respectively.
When the hill climbing is directed to the input of the feature extractor (type
2 attack), no information about the template storage format is required. Only
the size and file format presented to the feature extractor is needed. Adler pro-
posed in [13] a type 2 attack with a face recognition system. The input image is
conveniently modified until a desired matching score is attained. Adler reports
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results on three comercial recognition systems and shows that after 4000 itera-
tions a score corresponding to a very high confidence (99.9%) of matching scores
is reached for all systems tested.
In [14] Uludag and Jain introduced a hill climbing algorithm to attack a
fingerprint verification system which was further studied in [15]. In these attacks
a synthetic random minutia template is presented to the input of the matcher
(type 4 attack) and, according to the score generated, it is iteratively changed
until the system returns a positive verification. The minutiae in the template
are modified one at a time and the change is only stored if the score returned by
the matcher improves the previous one, otherwise it is discarded. Thus, to carry
out this type of attack we need: i) the resolution and size of the images captured
by the sensor (which is usually a parameter specified by the vendor), ii) the
template format, and iii) access to the matcher input (to present the synthetic
templates) and output (to get the necessary feedback from the scores). In this
case we know how the information is stored, but not what the information is.
In [16] Cappelli et al. describe a fast and reliable method to generate realistic
synthetic fingerprint images, which is implemented in the software tool SFinGe
(Synthetic Fingerprint Generator). With this application, a type 4 attack (to
the input of the matcher) using synthetic generated templates could easily be
converted to a type 2 attack (to the input of the feature extractor) using the
corresponding synthetic fingerprint images. Thus, the attack would be simplified
as the intruder would not need to know the storage format used in the system.
Furthermore, an algorithm to reconstruct the real fingerprint image from its
ISO minutia-based template has been recently proposed in [17]. In this case, if
a legitimate user’s template is compromised it could be used to carry out a type
2 attack against the system (reconstructing the real fingerprint image), or even
a direct attack (building a gummy fingerprint from the image).
2.3 Direct attacks on iris-based recognition systems
Although the iris acquisition process still leaves room for improvement (collecting
good quality iris images from medium distances is still an open issue), the iris is
one of the most strongly emerging biometric traits in the market, thanks to the
high accuracy of the algorithms used in its recognition. Iris-based verification
systems have shown a remarkable performance on normal operation conditions,
however, several works have pointed out their vulnerabilities to very simple direct
attacks carried out with photographs of the user’s iris.
One of the first efforts in the vulnerabilities study of iris verification systems
was carried out by Thalheim and Krissler and reported in [9]. In this work an iris
image of a legitimate user was printed with a high resolution inkjet printer to
fraudulently access the system. The trick was only successful if the pupil in the
image was cut off and the eye of the impostor placed behind the paper to give
the impression to the system of a real eye. Only one commercial system (the
Panasonic’s Authenticam BM-ET100) was tested in the experiments showing
high vulnerability to this type of attacks. It not only permitted the access with
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the fake iris, but also allowed the attacker to log on to the system using the iris
picture.
In [18] Matsumoto et al. carried out the first systematic experiment of iris
spoofing. Three different iris verification systems were tested, two portable: the
IrisPass-h by Oki, and the Authenticam BM-ET100US by Panasonic, and the
remaining system being a hard-core device for gate control (IrisPass-WG by
Oki). Two different devices were used in the experiments to acquire the images
for the fake irises, the camera embedded in the IrisPass-h system and a digital
microscope with infrared lighting. As explained in Thalheim’s experiments, the
images were then printed using a high resolution inkjet printer and the pupil
removed from the picture in order to place the impostor’s eye behind the fake
iris. When using the images taken with the IrisPass camera, all three systems
accepted the fake irises as real with a probability of over 50%. In the case of
the digital microscope pictures, the attacks success rate was over 15% for the
portable systems, and around 5% for the gate control application or bitches.
3 Liveness Detection Methods
3.1 Liveness detection using fingerprints
As a countermeasure against direct attacks, several methods to discriminate
between real and fake fingerprints have been proposed over the last few years.
One of the first efforts in liveness detection was reported in [19], where the
periodicity of sweat and the sweat diffusion pattern were used to detect fake
fingerprints applying a ridge signal algorithm. The same technique but using a
wavelet-based algorithm was described in [20]. These two works were extended
in [21] where a new intensity-based perspiration liveness detection technique is
described, reporting detection rates between 90% and 100%.
In [22] Cappelli defined a skin distortion model which is used in [23] to develop
a novel liveness detection method based on skin elasticity properties. The user is
asked to deliberately rotate his finger when removing it from the sensor surface
thus producing considerable skin distortion which is later used as a fingerprint
liveness measure. The system was attacked with gummy fingerprints showing
a significant improvement over the robustness of the application functioning
without the anti spoofing technique (over 95% of the intruders were rejected).
Some research has been carried out to use odor as a liveness detection pro-
cedure. In [24] an odor sensor (electronic nose) is used to discriminate the skin
odor from that of other materials such as latex, silicone or gelatin. Although
the system showed a remarkable performance detecting fake fingerprints made
of silicone, it still showed some weakness recognizing imitations made of other
materials such as gelatine, as the sensor response was very similar to that caused
by human skin.
3.2 Liveness detection using iris
The experiments reported in [9] and [18] have shown the necessity of incorporat-
ing liveness detection techniques in the commercial iris verification applications
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in order to prevent eventual direct attacks carried out against the system. In
the last few years several efforts have been made in this direction, leading to
different iris liveness detection methods.
In [25] Daugman proposes some eye features that could be used as coun-
termeasures against direct attacks. Among these characteristics he mentions the
spectrographic properties of different parts of the eye (tissue, fat, blood, melanin
pigment), the coaxial retinal back reflection (the red eye effect) and the four
Purkinje reflections caused by each of the four optical surfaces comprised inside
the eye. These reflections can only be observed with very high quality cameras
not used in common iris identification systems.
A second group of possible anti spoofing mechanisms highlighted in [25] are
those based on behavioural eye features. One of these liveness detection methods
is based in the detection of the eye hippus, which is the permanent oscillation
that the eye pupil presents even under uniform lighting conditions. Another
possibility is to measure the pupil response to a sudden lighting event (switching
on of a diode) or to ask the user to do voluntary actions (eye movements, eye
blinks). Although all these features could work for liveness detection porpuses,
no real implementation is described, nor results reported in [25].
More recently, Pacut and Czajka proposed in [26] a third group of possible
anti-spoofing measures different to the spectrographic and behavioral methods
suggested by Daugman. This third group of techniques uses the external eye
features, such as frequency analysis and 3D detection (passive measurement) or
inflicted infrared light reflections from the moist cornea (active measurement),
to distinguish between real and fake eyes. In this work, three different liveness
detection techniques are described and implemented, and several tests are carried
out on a database of over 700 real and printed eye images. Each of the three
methods is based on Frequency Spectrum Analysis, Controlled Light Reflection
Analysis and Pupil Dynamics Analysis, respectively. Two cameras were used in
the experiments (the ET100 and ET300 by Panasonic), and all three techniques
showed remarkable performance in the fake eye detection.
4 Conclusions
In order to improve the performance of biometric systems it is of great impor-
tance to study its vulnerabilities to external attacks. In the recent years several
works have reported experimental results regarding the robustness of automatic
recognition systems to direct and indirect attacks. In the present paper a state-
of-the-art review of the attacks to fingerprint- and iris-based security systems
has been presented. Some of the countermeasures based on physiological prop-
erties (i.e. liveness detection methods) proposed in the literature to improve the
robustness of the systems, are also summarized.
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